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Signaling

1,155 bytes added, 05:04, 24 May 2015
Main dependent construct(s)/factor(s)
== Main dependent construct(s)/factor(s)==
*Job outcome, price premium
== Main independent construct(s)/factor(s) ==
*signals such as education (job applicants), warranty (products)
== Concise description of theory ==
*In economics, more precisely in contract theory, '''signaling''' is the idea that one party (termed the ''agent'') credibly conveys some information about itself to another party (the ''principal''). For example, in Michael Spence's job-market signalling model, (potential) employees send a signal about their ability level to the employer by acquiring certain education credentials. The informational value of the credential comes from the fact that the employer assumes it is positively correlated with having greater ability.
== Diagram/schematic of theory ==
== Originating author(s) ==
*Michael Spence
== Seminal articles ==
*Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. ''The Quarterly Journal of Economics'', 355-374.
== Originating area ==
*Economics
== Level of analysis ==
*Individual, product, firm
== Links to WWW sites describing theory ==
*http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_%28economics%29
== Links from this theory to other theories ==
*Uncertainty theory, asymmetric information
== IS articles that use the theory ==
*Dimoka, A., Hong, Y., & Pavlou, P. A. (2012). On product uncertainty in online markets: theory and evidence. ''MIS Quarterly'', ''36''(2), 395-426.*Ghose, A. (2009). Internet exchanges for used goods: An empirical analysis of trade patterns and adverse selection. ''Mis Quarterly'', 263-291.
== Contributor(s) ==
*
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