- 1 Theory Name
- 2 Acronym
- 3 Alternate name(s)
- 4 Main dependent construct(s)/factor(s)
- 5 Main independent construct(s)/factor(s)
- 6 Concise description of theory
- 7 Diagram/schematic of theory
- 8 Originating author(s)
- 9 Seminal articles
- 10 Originating area
- 11 Level of analysis
- 12 Links to WWW sites describing theory
- 13 Links from this theory to other theories
- 14 IS articles that use the theory
- 15 Contributor(s)
- 16 Date last updated
- Signaling Theory
Main dependent construct(s)/factor(s)
- Job outcome, price premium
Main independent construct(s)/factor(s)
- signals such as education (job applicants), warranty (products)
Concise description of theory
- In economics, more precisely in contract theory, signaling is the idea that one party (termed the agent) credibly conveys some information about itself to another party (the principal). For example, in Michael Spence's job-market signalling model, (potential) employees send a signal about their ability level to the employer by acquiring certain education credentials. The informational value of the credential comes from the fact that the employer assumes it is positively correlated with having greater ability.
Diagram/schematic of theory
- Michael Spence
- Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 355-374.
Level of analysis
- Individual, product, firm
Links to WWW sites describing theory
Links from this theory to other theories
- Uncertainty theory, asymmetric information
IS articles that use the theory
- Dimoka, A., Hong, Y., & Pavlou, P. A. (2012). On product uncertainty in online markets: theory and evidence. MIS Quarterly, 36(2), 395-426.
- Ghose, A. (2009). Internet exchanges for used goods: An empirical analysis of trade patterns and adverse selection. Mis Quarterly, 263-291.
Date last updated
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